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The United States Supreme Court (Mostly) 
Gives Up Its Review Role with Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Cases 
Paul Marcus† 
  GIDEON   
On the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright,1 just a 
few years ago, both legal and lay commentators wrote and 
spoke glowingly of this “landmark case, guaranteeing the right 
to counsel in criminal cases, [which] forever changed America’s 
criminal justice system.”2 “Gideon, like several other of the 
landmark cases . . . seemed to offer a promise to all people in 
the American criminal justice system. In this case it was sup-
posed to be complete equality before the law, even if one could 
not afford counsel.”3 Congressman John Conyers said this about 
Gideon: “Fair trials, wherein everyone—no matter their ability 
to pay—is equal before the law through the right to counsel, is 
at the core of our country’s judicial system. The Supreme Court 
made history in recognizing this fundamental right, and ex-
tending it to defendants at the state level.”4 As then Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy said: 
 
†  Haynes Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. The author 
served as Co-Reporter for three years to the National Right to Counsel Com-
mittee. The findings reached by the two Co-Reporters during that period may 
be seen in Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal 
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006). Copyright © 2016 by 
Paul Marcus. 
 1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 2. Gideon v. Wainwright—Case Providing Defendants an Attorney—
Turns 50, CBS NEWS (Mar. 16, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
gideon-v-wainwright-case-providing-defendants-an-attorney-turns-50. 
 3. Kenneth J. Bernstein, Thoughts on the 50th Anniversary of Gideon v. 
Wainwright, DAILY KOS (Mar. 18, 2013, 4:55 AM), http://www.dailykos 
.com/story/2013/03/18/1194921/-Thoughts-on-the-50th-Anniversary-of-Gideon 
-v-Wainwright. 
 4. Conyers Honors 50th Anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright Decision, 
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY DEMOCRATS (Mar. 15, 2013), http://  
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If an obscure Florida convict named Clarence Earl Gideon had not sat 
down in his prison cell with a pencil and paper to write a letter to the 
Supreme Court, and if the Court had not taken the trouble to look for 
merit in that one crude petition . . . the vast machinery of American 
law would have gone on functioning undisturbed. But Gideon did 
write that letter, the Court did look into his case . . . and the whole 
course of American legal history has been changed.5 
To be sure, I would go even a step beyond this celebratory 
language and note that the Gideon decision remains the single 
most significant criminal justice decision ever written by an 
American court. More important than the death penalty cases,6 
Miranda v. Arizona,7 or even the exclusionary rule holdings.8 
The reason can be stated plainly: prior to Gideon, many crimi-
nal defendants were not represented by lawyers even in serious 
criminal cases. It is, certainly, difficult to give precise empirical 
support for this conclusion more than fifty years after the fact. 
Still, with but a few observations, the statement seems more 
than reasonable. The vast majority of criminal cases are re-
solved in state courts, not in the federal system.9 Also, the vast 
majority of criminal defendants are indigent, unable to pay for 




 5. The Legacy of Gideon v. Wainwright, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 3, 
2016), http://www.justice.gov/atj/fifty-years-later-legacy-gideon-v-wainwright 
(quoting Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Speech Before the New Eng-
land Conference on the Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime (Nov. 1, 
1963)). 
 6. This includes cases initially limiting or striking down capital punish-
ment, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and reinstating it, Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that, under the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, warnings must be given to suspects in custody 
who are being interrogated). 
 8. Beginning with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court 
has used the exclusion of evidence as the key remedy in some federal and state 
cases for government violations of rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments (search and seizure, privilege against self-incrimination, and the 
right to counsel, respectively). 
 9. It has been fairly estimated that ninety-five percent of all criminal 
cases are tried in state courts. See Amanda Myra Hornung, The Paper Tiger of 
Gideon v. Wainwright and the Evisceration of the Right to Appointment of Le-
gal Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
495, 499 n.6 (2005). 
 10. As stated by one commentator, “Though indigents probably represent 
no more than 10–20 percent of the population, they account for 80 percent of 
those charged in felony cases.” Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indi-
gent Defendants: Theory and Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505, 507 
n.14 (2015). 
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counsel right for indigent criminal defendants long ago,11 many 
states did not at the time of Gideon.12 It is not a very large leap, 
 
 11. In an opinion written by Justice Black, the Court discussed the need 
for counsel in all criminal cases prosecuted in federal court: 
The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the 
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not still be 
done. It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the 
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect 
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or 
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and 
learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the 
lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and 
mysterious . . . .  
  The . . . right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if 
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the in-
telligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in 
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of 
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel 
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to 
prepare his defence [sic], even though he have a perfect one. He re-
quires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him. The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in 
all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an ac-
cused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of 
counsel.  
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938) (citations omitted). 
 12. Justice Black, dissenting in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 477 n.2 
(1942)—the so-called “special circumstances” case overruled by Gideon—
discussed the numbers: 
In thirty-five states, there is some clear legal requirement or an es-
tablished practice that indigent defendants in serious noncapital as 
well as capital criminal cases (e.g., where the crime charged is a felo-
ny, a “penitentiary offense,” an offense punishable by imprisonment 
for several years) be provided with counsel on request. In nine states, 
there are no clearly controlling statutory or constitutional provisions, 
and no decisive reported cases on the subject. In two states, there are 
dicta in judicial decisions indicating a probability that the holding of 
the court below in this case would be followed under similar circum-
stances. In only two states (including the one in which this case arose) 
has the practice here upheld by this Court been affirmatively sus-
tained . . . . 
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, believed that most states did not 
view counsel as central to our system of justice:  
This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of the States, 
it has been the considered judgment of the people, their representa-
tives, and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamen-
tal right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary, the matter has 
generally been deemed one of legislative policy. 
Id. at 471. As further proof of the point, one ought not forget that Clarence 
Earl Gideon—clearly indigent—was convicted of a felony—breaking and enter-
ing with intent to commit a crime—after representing himself at trial. Gideon 
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then, to say that Gideon affected enormous numbers of state 
criminal defendants, and did so almost immediately. 
There is, indeed, much to celebrate about Gideon. “The sto-
ry of the case—that is, the story of Clarence Earl Gideon—is 
remarkable in every way.”13 It is especially worth writing about 
in this Symposium, for the involvements of the State of Minne-
sota, and one Minnesotan, Walter Mondale, were vital to the 
decision resulting in the great changes in our criminal justice 
system. Perhaps it is better to have a Minnesota judge explain 
why this is so: 
Gideon v. Wainwright has a unique Minnesota connection. Walter 
Mondale was at the time the Attorney General of Minnesota. He had 
political ambition and so “siding” with a four-time convicted felon 
made simply no political sense. By today’s standards of politics, what 
Mondale did was political insanity. Minnesota already provided coun-
sel for poor people accused of felonies as did a significant number of 
other states. Florida claimed Gideon’s case as a state’s rights issue. 
According to the Florida Attorney General, the United States Su-
preme Court had no business telling states what a fair criminal jus-
tice system entailed.  
  Rather than support Florida or simply ignore the issue, Mondale 
wrote, “I believe in federalism and states’ rights too. But I also believe 
in the Bill of Rights . . . . Nobody knows better than an attorney gen-
eral or a prosecuting attorney that in this day and age furnishing an 
attorney to those felony defendants who can’t afford to hire one is ‘fair 
and feasible.’ Nobody knows better than we do that rules of criminal 
law and procedure which baffle trained professionals can only over-
whelm the uninitiated . . . .” Mondale organized an effort to gain the 
support of other states in Gideon’s effort to require lawyers for the 
poor. Mondale got 23 states to join his brief on behalf of Gideon, in-
cluding three, Hawaii, Maine and Rhode Island, that had no general 




requested that the court appoint a lawyer for him, but the judge could not do 
so: Florida state law only allowed for appointments in capital cases. Gideon 
was sentenced to five years in prison. 
 13. Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years 
After “Gideon,” ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/  
national/archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years 
-after-gideon/273433. The title of Mr. Cohen’s article, of course, gives some 
idea what many—including this writer—believe has happened in the half cen-
tury since the Court’s epic ruling. 
 14. Kevin Burke, Happy Anniversary, Clarence Gideon, MINNPOST  
(Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2013/03/happy 
-anniversary-clarence-gideon. 
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  STRICKLAND   
In recent years especially, there has been considerable crit-
icism over the way Gideon has been applied, or inadequately 
applied. On the former point, commentators have expressed 
frustration with Supreme Court decisions limiting the reach of 
Gideon only to cases involving actual imprisonment as a sen-
tence for the convicted defendant,15 to important events that oc-
cur after an adversary judicial proceeding,16 and to pretrial pro-
ceedings in which the defendant is faced with an adversary 
judicial proceeding.17 On the latter point, many lawyers, judges, 
and commentators have discussed an overwhelmed criminal 
justice system in which defendants truly do not have adequate 
representation. One scholar wrote: 
Despite voluminous empirical evidence and scholarly research de-
scribing the national crisis in indigent defense services, this seeming-
ly intractable crisis persists . . . . Indigent defense systems across the 
nation operate with far too little money, resulting in a host of interre-
lated consequences. Public defenders carry excessive caseloads, they 
have inadequate, if any, access to investigative and expert assistance, 
and they cannot meet with and counsel their clients effectively and in 
a timely manner. Defense counsel working under these circumstances 
can barely satisfy their professional and ethical obligations, let alone 
provide zealous representation. Clients of these defenders suffer a 
host of otherwise avoidable consequences. Many indigent defendants 
make unintelligent waivers of their right to counsel, endure months 
in jail without hearing a status report from their lawyers, fail to se-
cure pre-trial releases from jail, and either agree to plea bargains or 
go to trial without adequate discussion or preparation. In short, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has yet to be realized for most in-
digent defendants across the country.18 
 
 15. The right to counsel is not violated where the judge could have sen-
tenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment but did not do so. Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 16. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding the Constitution man-
dates a lawyer at a lineup only after the defendant has been formally 
charged). 
 17. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (holding that, even if the 
defendant has been formally charged, there is no right to a lawyer at a photo 
identification display). These limitations are critiqued in Paul Marcus, Why 
the United States Supreme Court Got Some (but Not a Lot) of the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 145–
49 (2009). 
 18. Cara Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional So-
lution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 488–
89 (2010). Another was more succinct: “Year after year, in study after study, 
observers find remarkably poor defense lawyering.” Ronald F. Wright, Parity 
of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 
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It is not simply that quite a number of public defense and 
appointed lawyers are overwhelmed by massive caseloads—
though surely many are. It is that some of these attorneys, and 
others, provide assistance that is not competent and that ought 
not to be tolerated. The Supreme Court has made this point re-
peatedly, with the Justices frequently noting “the right to coun-
sel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel,”19 and “the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock 
principle in our justice system.”20 The decision of the Court that 
has been the guiding light on ineffective assistance is Strick-
land v. Washington.21  
While the Court in Strickland reiterated the long-held view 
that counsel in criminal cases must be effective,22 the decision 
there is chiefly looked to as laying out “the proper standards for 
judging a criminal defendant’s contention that the Constitution 
requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because 
counsel’s assistance at the trial or sentencing was ineffective.”23 
Justice O’Connor, for the majority, made clear that the stand-
ard really consisted of two different parts, each of which is a 
 
IOWA L. REV. 219, 221 (2004). During his tenure as the Attorney General of 
the United States, Eric Holder expressed similar concerns: 
America’s indigent defense systems exist in a state of crisis. Like 
many of you, this is something I’ve seen firsthand. As a judge on the 
District of Columbia Superior Court—and, later, as United States At-
torney for the District of Columbia—I frequently witnessed the devas-
tating consequences of inadequate representation. I saw that wrong-
ful convictions and unjust sentences carry a moral cost that’s 
impossible to measure—and undermine the strength, integrity, and 
public trust in our legal system. I also recognize that, in purely eco-
nomic terms, they drain precious taxpayer resources—and constitute 
an outrageous waste of court funds on new filings, retrials, and ap-
peals just because the system failed to get it right the first time. 
Andrew Cohen, Eric Holder: A “State of Crisis” for the Right to Counsel, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/ 
03/eric-holder-a-state-of-crisis-for-the-right-to-counsel/274074. 
 19. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 20. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012); see also Maryland v. 
Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. 2, 2 (2015). 
 21. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 22. Noting: 
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of coun-
sel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the 
ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is 
entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, 
who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. For that 
reason, the Court has recognized that “the right to counsel is the right 
to the effective assistance of counsel.” 
Id. at 685–86 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14). 
 23. Id. at 671. 
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major hurdle for a complaining, convicted criminal defendant to 
go over. 
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was defi-
cient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defend-
ant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires show-
ing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.24 
The Supreme Court had, until recently, given little guid-
ance as to how those two parts—deficient performance and 
prejudice to the defendant—were to be construed. What we did 
know, though, was that each was extremely challenging for de-
fendants. The first part proved challenging because a “defend-
ant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness,”25 and because there is a 
“strong presumption” that a lawyer’s performance is “within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”26 Power-
ful language, made all the more trying because in many cases it 
is not that the defense counsel did something affirmatively 
wrong, such as citing overruled cases, relying on the wrong 
statute, etc. Rather, it could well be that—as pointed out by 
dissenting Justice Marshall in Strickland—the problem is that 
the defense counsel simply did not do her job vigorously in 
terms of preparation, organization, or thorough review.27 
 
 24. Id. at 687. Professor Stephen J. Smith very capably explains the prin-
ciples here in his essay, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 
515 (2009); see also Sanjay Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing 
Legacy of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351 
(2009); Brooke R. Hardy, Criminal Procedure: Finding the Needle—Toward a 
More Stringent Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel, 58 FLA. L. REV. 
449 (2006); Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. 
Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 
77 (2007).  
 25. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 26. Id. at 689. 
 27. Marshall noted:  
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a 
trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared bet-
ter if his lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases 
can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. On the basis of 
a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to 
ascertain how the government’s evidence and arguments would have 
stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-
prepared lawyer. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact 
are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the de-
fendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the in-
competence of defense counsel. 
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If, though, the record demonstrates low performance, es-
tablishing prejudice is even more difficult because the defend-
ant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a proba-
bility sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”28 If 
Justice Marshall is correct, and I believe he is, how does one 
prove the negative: how does one show what would have hap-
pened if there had been an engaged, thoughtful, and committed 
lawyer handling the trial? Proof of prejudice? Hardly likely to 
happen very often. 
  THE CAPITAL CASES   
For many years this trying situation was lamented, criti-
cized, and anguished over. The Court was not movable. Not, 
that is, until two areas came before the Justices raising con-
cerns over the application of Strickland. The first was with cap-
ital cases; the second was with cases involving so-called collat-
eral consequences. 
The Supreme Court has been actively involved with the re-
view of ineffective assistance claims in death penalty convic-
tions, unlike its role with other convictions (apart from the col-
lateral consequences matters, below). In a series of decisions 
over the past two decades, the Justices have mapped out seri-
ous problems with capital representation and with the applica-
tion of generally accepted best practices. As one observer 
opined, with these cases, “the Court no longer ignores profes-
sional standards of conduct in deciding what constitutes consti-
 
Id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 694. The Supreme Court in Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 
(2002), reiterated the three situations where prejudice could be presumed, as 
first identified in United States v. Cronic:  
First and “[m]ost obvious” was the “complete denial of counsel.” A tri-
al would be presumptively unfair, we said, where the accused is de-
nied the presence of counsel at “a critical stage,” [denoting] a step of a 
criminal proceeding, such as arraignment, that held significant con-
sequences for the accused. Second, we posited that a similar presump-
tion was warranted if “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecu-
tion’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Finally, we said that in 
cases . . . where counsel is called upon to render assistance under cir-
cumstances where competent counsel very likely could not, the de-
fendant need not show that the proceedings were affected.  
466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). Such situations are rare. 
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tutionally ‘effective’ representation or tolerates minimal efforts 
by counsel.”29  
In each of these capital cases, the Court found Sixth 
Amendment violations, and strongly chastised the work of the 
attorneys involved: 
Williams v. Taylor.30 While there was considerable mitigat-
ing evidence that might have moved the decision from death to 
life,31 the trial attorneys did not begin preparation until just be-
fore the trial and missed out on quite a bit of that mitigating 
evidence. “[I]t is undisputed that Williams had a right—indeed, 
a constitutionally protected right—to provide the jury with the 
mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to dis-
cover or failed to offer.”32 
Wiggins v. Smith.33 The defense lawyers did conduct a lim-
ited investigation and did offer some mitigating evidence, but 
failed to engage in a broad investigation and thus did not un-
cover significant and disturbing mitigating evidence.34 
“[I]nvestigations into mitigating evidence ‘should comprise ef-
forts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence 
 
 29. Smith, supra note 24, at 517. 
 30. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 31. Id. at 370 (“Among the evidence reviewed that had not been presented 
at trial were documents prepared in connection with Williams’ commitment 
when he was 11 years old that dramatically described mistreatment, abuse, 
and neglect during his early childhood, as well as testimony that he was ‘bor-
derline mentally retarded,’ had suffered repeated head injuries, and might 
have mental impairments organic in origin.”).  
 32. Id. at 393. Williams is also noteworthy because the Court relied on the 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44.1, cmt., at 4–55 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) 
in finding that trial counsel did not fulfill “their obligation to conduct a thor-
ough investigation of the defendant’s background.” Id. at 396. But see infra 
note 42 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s late retreat on this subject).  
 33. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 34. The lawyers’ performance was truly neglectful, as described by Justice 
O’Connor: 
The records revealed several facts: Petitioner’s mother was a chronic 
alcoholic; Wiggins was shuttled from foster home to foster home and 
displayed some emotional difficulties while there; he had frequent, 
lengthy absences from school; and, on at least one occasion, his moth-
er left him and his siblings alone for days without food. As the Feder-
al District Court emphasized, any reasonably competent attorney 
would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to mak-
ing an informed choice among possible defenses, particularly given 
the apparent absence of any aggravating factors in petitioner’s back-
ground. 
Id. at 525 (citations omitted). 
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and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be in-
troduced by the prosecutor.’”35 
Sears v. Upton.36 The state court held that the trial attor-
ney’s performance violated the Sixth Amendment, but conclud-
ed that the prejudice prong under Strickland had not been met. 
The United States Supreme Court did not agree:  
We have never limited the prejudice inquiry under Strickland to cas-
es in which there was only “little or no mitigation evidence” present-
ed, we have considered cases involving such circumstances, and we 
have explained that there is no prejudice when the new mitigating ev-
idence “would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented” to 
the decision maker. But we also have found deficiency and prejudice 
in other cases in which counsel presented what could be described as 
a superficially reasonable mitigation theory during the penalty 
phase.37 
Hinton v. Alabama.38 The defense lawyer sought $1,000 in 
funds to hire an expert to assist on a ballistics test. This test 
was central to the government’s case. The lawyer retained an 
expert he could afford for the $1,000, but one whom he had 
doubts about. The lawyer asked for only $1,000 in the mistaken 
belief that this was the statutory limit to which his client was 
entitled. “[I]t was unreasonable for Hinton’s lawyer to fail to 
seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was 
 
 35. Id. at 524 (quoting the ABA Guidelines). Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 
374 (2005), relying on Williams and Wiggins, is another important case explor-
ing a lawyer’s obligations in presenting mitigation evidence in a capital trial. 
And, once more, the concern here was with the lawyer’s inadequate investiga-
tion: 
When new counsel entered the case to raise Rompilla’s postconviction 
claims, however, they identified a number of likely avenues the trial 
lawyers could fruitfully have followed in building a mitigation case. 
School records are one example, which trial counsel never examined 
in spite of the professed unfamiliarity of the several family members 
with Rompilla’s childhood, and despite counsel’s knowledge that 
Rompilla left school after the ninth grade. Others examples are rec-
ords of Rompilla’s juvenile and adult incarcerations, which counsel 
did not consult, although they were aware of their client’s criminal 
record. And while counsel knew from police reports provided in pre-
trial discovery that Rompilla had been drinking heavily at the time of 
his offense, and although one of the mental health experts reported 
that Rompilla’s troubles with alcohol merited further investigation, 
counsel did not look for evidence of a history of dependence on alcohol 
that might have extenuating significance. 
Id. at 382 (citations omitted). 
 36. 561 U.S. 945 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 954 (citations omitted). 
 38. 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014). 
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based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that 
available funding was capped at $1,000 . . . .”39 
Still, even in capital cases the Court will not easily find 
constitutional problems with less than superior representation. 
To be sure, there are also capital cases in which the Court did 
not find Sixth Amendment violations. In each case, though, it 
gave a careful review of the work of the attorneys involved40: 
Bobby v. Van Hook.41 When determining ineffectiveness 
under Strickland, it is improper to rely heavily on the Ameri-
can Bar Association guidelines for performance of counsel. 
“‘[The] American Bar Association standards and the like’ are 
‘only guides’ to what reasonableness means, not its defini-
tion.”42 
 
 39. Id. at 1088. Because no state court had considered the prejudice ques-
tion, the Court remanded. Still, its view on the subject was hardly hidden: 
[I]f there is a reasonable probability that Hinton’s attorney would 
have hired an expert who would have instilled in the jury a reasona-
ble doubt as to Hinton’s guilt had the attorney known that the statu-
tory funding limit had been lifted, then Hinton was prejudiced by his 
lawyer’s deficient performance and is entitled to a new trial. 
  That the State presented testimony from two experienced expert 
witnesses that tended to inculpate Hinton does not, taken alone, 
demonstrate that Hinton is guilty. Prosecution experts, of course, can 
sometimes make mistakes. Indeed, we have recognized the threat to 
fair criminal trials posed by the potential for incompetent or fraudu-
lent prosecution forensics experts, noting that “[s]erious deficiencies 
have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal tri-
als . . . . One study of cases in which exonerating evidence resulted in 
the overturning of criminal convictions concluded that invalid forensic 
testimony contributed to the convictions in 60% of the cases.”  
Id. at 1089–90 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 
(2009)). 
 40. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 113 (2009) (“The failure to 
show ineffective assistance is also confirmed by the Magistrate Judge’s finding 
that counsel’s decision was essentially an informed one ‘made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ and was therefore 
‘virtually unchallengeable.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
690 (1984)); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1986) (“In this case, 
there are several reasons why counsel reasonably could have chosen to rely on 
a simple plea for mercy from petitioner himself. Any attempt to portray peti-
tioner as a nonviolent man would have opened the door for the State to rebut 
with evidence of petitioner’s prior convictions. This evidence had not previous-
ly been admitted in evidence, and trial counsel reasonably could have viewed 
it as particularly damaging.”). 
 41. 558 U.S. 4 (2009). 
 42. Id. at 17 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Concurring Justice 
Alito—while acknowledging that the “ABA is a venerable organization with a 
history of service to the bar”—went further: 
The views of the association’s members, not to mention the views of 
the members of the advisory committee that formulated the 2003 
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Bell v. Cone.43 The government had very strong evidence 
that the defendant had committed “a horribly brutal” crime 
against two elderly people, had earlier shot two others (one of 
whom was a police officer), and committed a robbery. At trial 
the defense lawyer gave no closing argument. The majority re-
iterated that under Strickland, “a court must indulge a ‘strong 
presumption’ that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance because it is all too easy 
to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was un-
reasonable in the harsh light of hindsight.”44 
Lockhart v. Fretwell.45 It is “defective” to apply the second 
part of the Strickland standard using “an analysis focusing 
solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to 
 
Guidelines, do not necessarily reflect the views of the American bar as 
a whole. It is the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature 
of the work that a defense attorney must do in a capital case in order 
to meet the obligations imposed by the Constitution, and I see no rea-
son why the ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged position in 
making that determination.  
Id. at 14. 
 43. 535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
 44. Id. at 702. The majority concluded that no constitutional violation had 
occurred: 
[Defense counsel] could make a closing argument and reprise for the 
jury, perhaps in greater detail than his opening, the primary mitigat-
ing evidence concerning his client’s drug dependency and posttrau-
matic stress from Vietnam. And he could plead again for life for his 
client and impress upon the jurors the importance of what he believed 
were less significant facts, such as the Bronze Star decoration or his 
client’s expression of remorse. But he knew that if he took this oppor-
tunity, he would give the lead prosecutor, who all agreed was very 
persuasive, the chance to depict his client as a heartless killer just be-
fore the jurors began deliberation. 
Id. at 701–02. Dissenting Justice Stevens disagreed: 
Counsel’s shortcomings included a failure to interview witnesses who 
could have provided mitigating evidence; a failure to introduce avail-
able mitigating evidence; and the failure to make any closing argu-
ment or plea for his client’s life at the conclusion of the penalty phase. 
Furthermore, respondent’s counsel was, subsequent to trial, diag-
nosed with a mental illness that rendered him unqualified to practice 
law, and that apparently led to his suicide. These circumstances “jus-
tify a presumption that respondent’s conviction was insufficiently re-
liable to satisfy the Constitution.” 
Id. at 702–03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 662 (1984)). For a non-capital case in which the Court reiterated that 
the “strong presumption” must be followed, see Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 
(2011). 
 45. 506 U.S. 364 (1993). 
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whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair 
or unreliable.”46 
Burger v. Kemp.47 The ineffective assistance claim was 
keyed to the fact that defense counsel had a conflict of interest 
because his law partner had been appointed to represent one of 
the other defendants in that person’s later, separate trial, and 
that counsel had provided aid in that representation.  
  [T]he overlap of counsel, if any, did not so infect [counsel’s] repre-
sentation as to constitute an active representation of competing inter-
ests. Particularly in smaller communities where the supply of quali-
fied lawyers willing to accept the demanding and unrewarding work 
of representing capital prisoners is extremely limited, the defendants 
may actually benefit from the joint efforts of two partners who sup-
plement one another in their preparation48 
Not surprisingly, the Court has considered many capital 
cases dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In a 
number of areas, Justices have stated that capital cases involve 
“the penalty of death [which] is different in kind from any other 
punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.”49 
Nevertheless, the actual number of capital cases in the United 
States, in comparison to all criminal prosecutions, is extremely 
small.50 Therefore, while significant, judicial actions in this ar-
 
 46. Id. at 369. The Court explained further: “The essence of an ineffective-
assistance claim is that counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversari-
al balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair 
and the verdict rendered suspect.” Id. (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 
175 (1986)). 
 47. 483 U.S. 776 (1987). 
 48. Id. at 783–84. Once again dissenters took a different view: 
The presumption of prejudice in cases presenting a conflict of interest 
that adversely affected counsel’s performance is warranted because 
the duty of loyalty to a client is “perhaps the most basic” responsibil-
ity of counsel, and “it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the 
defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests.” This dif-
ficulty in assessing prejudice resulting from a conflict of interest is 
due in part to the fact that the conflict may affect almost any aspect 
of the lawyer’s preparation and presentation of the case. Because the 
conflict primarily compels the lawyer not to pursue certain arguments 
or take certain actions, it is all the more difficult to discern its effect.  
Id. at 800 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)). 
 49. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). Capital cases are scruti-
nized more closely than all other prosecutions. As stated in Cheney v. State, 
“[T]he death penalty may only be imposed upon those few murderers who are 
deemed the worst of the worst murderers.” 909 P.2d 74, 78 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1995). 
 50. Figuring out the ratio of all criminal cases to capital prosecutions is 
not a simple task. Of course, the states and the federal government can both 
prosecute capital cases if authorized by statute. On the federal level, the At-
torney General must approve all death penalty prosecutions. See Memoran-
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ea are of limited guidance in non-capital cases unless there is 
 
dum from Eric H. Holder, Jr. to All Federal Prosecutors (July 27, 2011), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FedDPRules2011.pdf. According 
to the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel, since the death penalty was 
reinstated in 1988, 498 cases have been approved by the Attorney General and 
prosecuted. Federal Death Penalty, FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL (Sept. 
22, 2015), https://www.capdefnet.org/FDPRC/pubmenu.aspx?menu_id=94&id= 
2094. Each year more than 60,000 criminal cases are prosecuted by the United 
States. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATIS-
TICAL REPORT 8 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/ 
2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf.  
Extensive research could not locate a single detailed database for all the 
states combined. The numbers for North Carolina may be seen as somewhat 
typical. In 2007, six capital cases were prosecuted in the state, compared to 
just under 100,000 total criminal cases that year. N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT 
DEF. SERV, CAPITAL TRIAL CASE STUDY: PAC AND EXPERT SPENDING IN PO-
TENTIALLY CAPITAL CASES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL 8 (2008), http://www.ncids 
.org/Reports%20&%20Data/Latest%20Releases/FY07CapitalStudyFinal.pdf; 
see also N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT (2014), http:// 
crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/Reports.aspx.  
The numbers are even more stark when viewing this chart: 
SIZE OF DEATH ROW BY YEAR (1968–present) 
 
1968 517 1982 1,050 1996 3,219 2010 3,158 
1969 575 1983 1,209 1997 3,335 2011 3,082 
1970 631 1984 1,405 1998 3,452 2012 3,033 
1971 642 1985 1,591 1999 3,527 2013 2,979 
1972 334 1986 1,781 2000 3,593 2014 3,054 
1973 134 1987 1,984 2001 3,581 2015 3,019 
1974 244 1988 2,124 2002 3,557  
1975 488 1989 2,250 2003 3,374  
1976 420 1990 2,356 2004 3,315  
1977 423 1991 2,482 2005 3,254  
1978 482 1992 2,575 2006 3,228  
1979 539 1993 2,716 2007 3,215  
1980 691 1994 2,890 2008 3,207  
1981 856 1995 3,054 2009 3,173  
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application beyond the death penalty area, a point to be dis-
cussed later in this Article.  
  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES   
In another area, however, the Court has issued only one 
major decision as to ineffective assistance, but it has already 
had a tremendous impact. In Padilla v. Kentucky,51 the Justices 
determined that, before a plea agreement is reached, the crimi-
nal defense attorney must advise his client regarding the im-
migration consequences of a guilty plea. Without such advice, 
the defendant may successfully claim ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The state court in Padilla would not consider the con-
stitutional assertion because “the advice he sought about the 
risk of deportation concerned only collateral matters, i.e., those 
matters not within the sentencing authority of the state trial 
court.”52 The rejection of that argument, as well as the view 
that the Sixth Amendment comes into play only with affirma-
tively erroneous advice, was powerful in Padilla: 
We have given serious consideration to the concerns . . . regarding the 
importance of protecting the finality of convictions obtained through 
guilty pleas. We confronted a similar “floodgates” concern [earlier] but 
nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to 
advise the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded 
guilty. 
  A flood did not follow in that decision’s wake. Surmounting Strick-
land’s high bar is never an easy task. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
performance must be highly deferential”; “[a]ttorney errors . . . are as 
likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be 
prejudicial.” Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a peti-
tioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bar-
gain would have been rational under the circumstances. There is no 
reason to doubt that lower courts—now quite experienced with apply-
ing Strickland—can effectively and efficiently use its framework to 
separate specious claims from those with substantial merit.53  
For two reasons, the impact of Padilla was both swift and 
widespread. First, the vast majority of criminal prosecutions 
are resolved through the plea bargaining process.54 Second, 
 
 51. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 52. Id. at 364; see also NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF CONVICTION, www.abacollateralconsequences.org (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2016) (laying out in detail these consequences throughout our na-
tion). 
 53. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371–72 (citations omitted). 
 54. The consistent estimate is that ninety percent or more criminal justice 
resolutions in the United States occur through plea bargaining. See Jed S. 
Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
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there is little reason to believe that the Padilla holding is lim-
ited to only those collateral consequences associated with im-
migration. As one astute scholar observed, a number of other 
matters can come within the holding.  
  Because of their importance and their automatic application after 
certain criminal convictions, strong candidates for Sixth Amendment 
coverage include sex offender registration and incarceration, losing 
the ability to earn a living, and losing the ability to have or gain cus-
tody of a relative or foster child. Other collateral consequences may 
loom large with respect to particular clients based on their particular 
circumstances.55 
To be sure, this was much of the reasoning in Justice 
Alito’s concurrence there:  
[A] criminal convictio[n] can carry a wide variety of consequences oth-
er than conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil 
forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public 
benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from 
the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licens-
es . . . . All of those consequences are “serious” . . . .56 
Justice Scalia, too, in his dissent warned that there was 
“no logical stopping point” that would limit the majority’s hold-
ing to deportation.57 The cases raising just such matters began 





 55. Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Col-
lateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L. REV. 675, 676 (2011). 
 56. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 377 (alteration in original). As stated in Derek 
Wikstrom, “No Logical Stopping-Point”: The Consequences of Padilla v. Ken-
tucky’s Inevitable Expansion, 106 NW. L. REV. 351, 361 (2012) (footnote omit-
ted), “[i]f deportation cannot be distinguished from other collateral conse-
quences on the basis of its relative seriousness or severity, or its relatedness to 
the penalties imposed by a criminal sentence, it will be difficult for courts to 
limit Padilla to the context in which it was decided.” 
 57. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 390. One commentator strongly disagreed with 
Justice Scalia about the wisdom of limiting Strickland and Padilla. See Hanh 
H. Le, The “Padilla Advisory” and Its Implications Beyond the Immigration 
Context, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 589, 614 (2011). 
 58. See, e.g., Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1273–75 (11th Cir. 
2010) (discussing additional involuntary civil commitment under state law); 
Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 387 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (looking to application 
of sex offender registry); State in Interest of C.P.H., No. A-0936-08T4, 2010 
WL 2926541, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2010) (same); Calvert v. 
State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 487–90 (Tenn. 2011) (discussing mandatory lifetime 
community supervision sentence). Not all courts have read Padilla so expan-
sively. As one judge stated, in Kim v. Director, Virginia Department of Correc-
tions, 103 F. Supp.3d 749, 756 (E.D. Va. 2015) (involving civil commitment as 
a sex offender), “there is no Supreme Court precedent rejecting the application 
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  A MORE ACTIVE ROLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT   
One can be quite critical of individual ineffective assistance 
decisions of the Court,59 and yet still praise it for the active role 
it played in looking at the performance of lawyers in capital 
prosecutions and cases involving collateral consequences. Yes, 
one should praise the Justices’ engagement in those areas, but 
surely one must also express genuine regret for the Court’s 
unwillingness to broadly discuss ineffective assistance almost 
anywhere else after Strickland was decided. There are some 
such cases, though not many. Glover v. United States,60 Roe v. 
Flores-Ortega,61 and Kimmelman v. Morrison62 all come to mind. 
 
of the direct/collateral consequences dichotomy in the context of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claims arising outside of the context of deportation.” See 
United States v. Bruno, 614 F. App’x 72, 74 (3d Cir. 2015) (dealing with forfei-
ture of pension); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 344 (Pa. 2012) 
(same); see also Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) 
(discussing eligibility to possess a firearm). 
 59. And I am. In particular, I believe the Court in Strickland got it wrong 
both in deferring so substantially to the trial lawyer and in making it so diffi-
cult to get a reversal even where defense counsel was ineffective. In short, I 
am persuaded by Justice Marshall’s dissent there. 
My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court is 
that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at 
all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth 
Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts. To tell 
lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant 
must behave “reasonably” and must act like “a reasonably competent 
attorney,” is to tell them almost nothing. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707–08 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (citation omitted).  
[T]he assumption on which the Court’s holding rests is that the only 
purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel is to reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convict-
ed. In my view, the guarantee also functions to ensure that convic-
tions are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures.  
Id. at 711 (footnote omitted).  
 60. 531 U.S. 198 (2000). 
 61. 528 U.S. 470 (2000). 
 62. 477 U.S. 365 (1986). There are others, though the number is surpris-
ingly limited. All totaled up, the Court has dealt in any sort of detailed way 
with less than twenty cases (apart from the capital and collateral consequenc-
es cases discussed above) which seriously discuss substantive concerns raised 
by Strickland. Some of these are certainly significant, but not for a look at the 
role of the defense lawyer at trial. See Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1377 
(2015) (per curiam) (discussing how counsel’s brief absence during testimony 
concerning other defendants did not make representation ineffective); Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (dealing with the important obligations of 
the defense lawyer at the plea negotiation stage); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 
1399, 1406 (2012) (same); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 746 (2011) (discuss-
ing valid strategy of a lawyer to advise defendant to enter a no-contest plea); 
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Each of these cases, though, is more than fifteen years old, and 
each also involves very narrow sets of circumstances. In Glover 
v. United States, the issue concerned the proper prejudice 
standard when a defendant is convicted in a mandatory non-
capital sentencing system (held, prejudice is shown even if the 
increase in sentence was not great).63 In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
the defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and claimed 
his lawyer was ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal 
(held, failure to file with the consent of the defendant is not per 
se deficient).64 In Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Court decided 
that the limitation on federal habeas corpus review of Fourth 
Amendment claims does not extend to Sixth Amendment inef-
fective assistance claims that are founded primarily on poor le-
gal representation as to a Fourth Amendment issue.65 
The response to the lament of insufficient involvement by 
the Supreme Court is surely this: “You, oh author, may not be-
lieve that it is clear Strickland applies well beyond the capital 
crime and collateral consequences situations, but many judges 
out there do, and there has already been a measurable impact 
in non-capital and non-collateral consequence cases.” As to the 
first point, consider this statement: “There is no reason to think 
that the Court’s recent emphasis on the reviewability of strate-
 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 372 (2010) (failing to request a limiting 
instruction to the jury was not ineffectiveness); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 
120, 121 (2008) (per curiam) (finding no constitutional problem with counsel 
briefly being linked to the courtroom via speakerphone); Massaro v. United 
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (holding defendant can raise ineffectiveness 
claim in a collateral proceeding). 
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam), is perhaps the most 
noteworthy, as the Justices considered a true trial issue—closing argument—
on the merits, though the case came up as a habeas corpus petition. Still, the 
entire discussion in the per curiam opinion is less than four pages in the Su-
preme Court Reporter, with the Court emphasizing that, under the habeas re-
view statute, federal courts must give “deference to the state courts that have 
primary responsibility for supervising defense counsel in state criminal trials.” 
Id. at 11. The courts must also—under Strickland—give “deference to coun-
sel’s tactical decision in his closing presentation.” Id. at 6. The most recent de-
cision is Maryland v. Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. 2 (2015) (per curiam), though it dealt 
with a remarkably narrow set of facts. In a very short per curiam opinion, the 
Court determined that it was not ineffective assistance for a lawyer to fail to 
challenge testimony based upon the so-called Comparative Bullet Lead Analy-
sis, widely relied upon at the time of the trial. This analysis “had fallen out of 
favor . . . . [And] was not generally accepted by the scientific community.” Id. 
at 2.  
 63. Glover, 531 U.S. at 198. 
 64. Roe, 528 U.S. at 470. 
 65. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 365.  
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gic decisions by defense attorneys is limited to capital cases.”66 
This could be true, but the best evidence still may be whether 
the Supreme Court itself has taken cases raising ineffective as-
sistance more broadly. The answer is that the Court has not. 
While it has—in detailed fashion—decided quite a number of 
capital cases in the area through the years, there are few non-
capital cases of true significance. Moreover, the central case is, 
of course, Strickland—a capital case—which linked the Sixth 
Amendment standard to the death penalty prosecution situa-
tion. This point was emphasized in Justice Brennan’s separate 
opinion in Strickland.  
Because of their flexibility and the requirement that they be consid-
ered in light of the particular circumstances of the case, the standards 
announced today can and should be applied with concern for the spe-
cial considerations that must attend review of counsel’s performance 
in a capital sentencing proceeding. In contrast to a case in which a 
finding of ineffective assistance requires a new trial, a conclusion that 
counsel was ineffective with respect to only the penalty phase of a 
capital trial imposes on the State the far lesser burden of reconsidera-
tion of the sentence alone. On the other hand, the consequences to the 
defendant of incompetent assistance at a capital sentencing could not, 
of course, be greater . . . . 
  For that reason, we have consistently required that capital pro-
ceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for 
procedural fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding . . . . 
  This Court has always insisted that the need for procedural safe-
guards is particularly great where life is at stake. Long before the 
Court established the right to counsel in all felony cases, it recognized 
that right in capital cases. Time and again the Court has condemned 
procedures in capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an 
ordinary case.67 
Still, it is undeniable that many judges and lawyers have 
looked at Strickland and the later Supreme Court capital cases 
and concluded that the standard set out there does apply in 
non-capital cases. This may be seen in state and federal deci-
sions relying on Strickland in non-capital cases,68 and in the 
 
 66. Smith, supra note 24, at 539. 
 67. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704–05 (1984) (citations omit-
ted). The majority opinion explains:  
When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at is-
sue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable proba-
bility that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate 
court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence—would 
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances did not warrant death. 
Id. at 695. 
 68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 32 N.E.3d 302, 304 (Mass. 
2015) (murder in the first degree—no capital punishment in the state); see also 
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empirical evidence available to show the impact of Strickland 
outside of the death penalty context.69 
With that in mind, then, one might well ask why the Su-
preme Court has not taken non-capital cases that raise ineffec-
tive assistance claims. It is not as if no such cases have come to 
the Court. Indeed, over the past twenty years numerous peti-
tions for certiorari have been presented that raise just such 
claims. In each case, the petition was denied.70 That there has 
not been an enormous number of such petitions is itself surpris-
ing. Considering some of the truly awful lawyering cases out 
there,71 one would have thought that many would ultimately 
 
United States v. Rangel, 781 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2015) (narcotics conspira-
cy); Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1987) (aggravated rape); 
Code v. Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481, 1482 (11th Cir. 1986) (armed robbery); 
United States v. Jasin, 215 F. Supp. 2d 552, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (arms embar-
go violation); Berry v. Gramley, 74 F. Supp. 2d 808, 809 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (ag-
gravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal sexual assault); Terrero v. 
State, 839 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (armed robbery); 
Gennetten v. State, 96 S.W.3d 143, 147–48 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (second degree 
murder). 
 69. The evidence is somewhat sparse. The best study, by John H. Blume 
and Stacey D. Neumann, is now a decade old. Still, looking at cases after the 
Court’s Williams decision in 2003, researchers found some evidence of more 
successful ineffective assistance claims. Many, if not most, rely on Strickland 
and the later capital cases. John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like 
Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. 
Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 127, 156 (2007). 
 70. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Stephens, 720 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1292 (2014) (ineffective assistance on direct appeal); Darden 
v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2871 (2013) (defense counsel conceding to jury guilt on some charges to pre-
serve credibility in defending other charges); Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 
625 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1575 (2012) (defense attorney slept 
through portions of the trial and used cocaine); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 
757 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1314 (2008) (prejudice resulting 
from counsel’s deficient questioning during voir dire); Sweeney v. Carter, 361 
F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1020 (2004) (lawyer’s per-
formance was terrible, but review limited by Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996); Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879 (2003) (attorney conflict of interest); Hines v. 
Miller, 318 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040 (2003) (al-
leged coercion in entering plea); State v. Wille, 595 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (La. 
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 880 (1992) (lawyer required to represent defend-
ant as part of community service obligation). 
 71. As noted by the Innocence Project, “[a] review of convictions over-
turned by DNA testing reveals a trail of sleeping, drunk, incompetent and 
overburdened defense attorneys, at the trial level and on appeal.” See general-
ly Inadequate Defense, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
causes-wrongful-conviction/inadequate-defense (last visited Mar. 22, 2016). 
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have come before the United States Supreme Court on request 
for review. Why then has this not happened? Why have we not 
seen a steady stream of rulings from the Court (à la the Fourth 
or Fifth Amendment lines of decisions) construing Strickland 
outside of the two areas discussed above? One obvious answer, 
at least, is that lawyers working on such matters (either on ap-
peal or, more likely, in a collateral proceeding) generally under-
stand that the ineffectiveness standard is so very difficult to 
achieve that it may not be worth their effort to file petitions for 
certiorari. Statements abound to that effect: 
“The Strickland test is notoriously difficult for defendants 
to meet, and the number of successful ineffective assistance 
claims is quite low.”72 
“In combination, these meta-rules signaled that Strickland 
claims are to be denied if there is any conceivable basis for ra-
tionalizing the attorney’s actions.”73 
“Strickland’s prejudice prong has proven to be a formidable 
obstacle in vindicating the right to counsel.”74 
“Strickland has been blasted by many commentators, 
rightly in my view. The simple restatement of the Strickland 
standard, as it has emerged in practice, is that a lawyer with a 
pulse will be deemed effective. Under the Strickland standard, 
a lawyer need not be awake, sober, prepared, knowledgeable, or 
sensible, at least in the large number of cases where courts find 
no prejudice.”75 
“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of 
others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical 
reasons rather than through sheer neglect.”76 
“A defendant must overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable as-
sistance.”77 
 
 72. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 1069, 1074 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 73. Smith, supra note 24, at 520–21.  
 74. Cecelia Klingele, Vindicating the Right to Counsel, 25 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 87, 87 (2012). 
 75. Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786–87 (1999) 
(reviewing MALCOLM M. FREELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAK-
ING AND THE MODERN STATE (2000)). 
 76. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam).  
 77. People v. La Pointe, 2015 IL App (2d) 130451. In Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 32 N.E.3d 302, 311 (Mass. 2015), the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts explained how the Strickland standard applies in its state, 
with the principle relating to the “reasonableness” of counsel’s performance. 
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“As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, Peti-
tioner’s burden to demonstrate prejudice is high.”78 
“The Strickland standard is, itself, already deferential, re-
quiring courts to apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s 
representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable pro-
fessional assistance.”79 
Even with cases involving severely deficient lawyering or 
difficult questions of law in which the defendant lost, under an 
application of the Strickland rules, petitions for certiorari often 
were not filed.80 
  CONCLUSION   
It would be most unfortunate to have a set of rules created 
by the Supreme Court on ineffective assistance of counsel that 
 
Reasonableness in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is an objective standard that measures counsel’s conduct 
against that which “lawyers of ordinary training and skill in the crim-
inal law” would consider competent. Although our cases applying the 
manifestly unreasonable test have not precisely marked the limits of 
a trial attorney’s prerogative to make strategic decisions, we have 
been clear that reasonableness does not demand perfection. Nor is 
reasonableness informed by what hindsight may reveal as a superior 
or better strategy. Counsel may strive for perfection, but only compe-
tence or the avoidance of a “serious incompetency” is required. The 
manifestly unreasonable test, therefore, is essentially a search for ra-
tionality in counsel’s strategic decisions, taking into account all the 
circumstances known or that should have been known to counsel in 
the exercise of his duty to provide effective representation to the cli-
ent and not whether counsel could have made alternative choices.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 78. Rodriguez v. Secretary, No. 2:12-CV-289-FTM-29, 2014 WL 7074210, 
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2014). 
 79. Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 80. There are many cases in both categories. Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 
619, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2011) (demonstrating that defense counsel slept through 
some of the trial, and issue becoming whether he slept through a “substantial” 
portion of the trial); McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1256 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding that complying with rules of professional responsibility protects 
lawyer from ineffective assistance claim); Kinsella v. State, 840 N.W.2d 625, 
630 (N.D. 2013) (illustrating a decision not to file motions to suppress). And 
the expenses involved—in both time and resources—of preparing petitions for 
review may be seen as too high, especially if the cause appears hopeless. 
Commentator Linda Greenhouse explained recently, “[g]iven the costs of ap-
pealing to the Supreme Court, potential petitioners calculate the odds. They 
will appeal when they conclude that the court wants to move the law in their 
direction, and will not appeal if they conclude otherwise.” Linda Greenhouse, 
Opinion, The Illusion of a Liberal Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/opinion/the-illusion-of-a-liberal-supreme 
-court.html (discussing Kevin T. McGuire et al., Measuring Policy Content on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 71 J. POL. 1305 (2009)). 
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applies principally to a limited number of cases. This is espe-
cially so when virtually all criminal justice professionals agree 
that the indigent defense counsel system in our country is in 
crisis. Certainly there is a solution to the problem. The Su-
preme Court should take some broad ineffective assistance cas-
es outside of the capital and collateral consequences areas. If it 
does, and the rulings make certain that Strickland and the lat-
er cases apply with equal force outside those areas, we would 
truly be able to believe that the Court meant what it said in 
Strickland: 
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. 
Counsel’s function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes 
the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. From 
counsel’s function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarch-
ing duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular 
duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to 
keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course 
of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill 
and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing 
process.81  
Nothing less can satisfy the principle stated—and ap-
plauded—in Gideon v. Wainwright: 
 
 81. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1983). There had been 
hope that the most recent case coming before the Court raising the ineffective 
assistance issue would help clarify matters. In Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 
1372, 1377 (2015) (per curiam), the Court stated that the Sixth Circuit found 
that the defense attorney provided prejudicial ineffective assistance when he 
was briefly absent during testimony concerning other defendants. The Justices 
did not reach the Sixth Amendment issue, looking to statutory limits on habe-
as corpus in reversing. 
Federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief if the underlying state-
court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” this Court. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  
. . . . 
AEDPA’s standard is intentionally “difficult to meet.”  
. . . . 
Because we consider this case only in the narrow context of federal 
habeas review, we “expres[s] no view on the merits of the underlying 
Sixth Amendment principle.”  
Id. at 1374 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  
Just two years earlier—in Marshall v. Rodgers—the Justices again de-
clined to look at the Sixth Amendment issue in light of the statutory require-
ment that relief could only be granted if the state court action was contrary to 
“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.” 133 S. Ct. 1447, 1449 (2013) (per curiam). There, the question 
dealt with a request to appoint an attorney to assist in filing a motion for a 
new trial. Id.  
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That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who 
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications 
of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessi-
ties, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may 
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some coun-
tries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and nation-
al constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and 
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial 
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This 
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has 
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.82 
 
 
 82. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
